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THE DOCTRINE OF AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE AS
BETWEEN ONE WHO TOOK BEFORE AND ONE
WHO TOOK AFTER-COMMON GRANTOR
ACQUIRED TITLE.
In studying a proposition of law it is often advisable to
study it not only from authority, but also from the stand-
point of the better reasoning. A proposition upon. which we
find much conflict of opinion is the point of who is to take
212
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title when two grantors hold deeds from a common source
of title and one of these deeds has been recorded before the
grantor took title and the other deed has been recorded since
he took title. To sustain the first deed would be observing
the technical rule of estoppel and overlooking the spirit of
the registry laws. To sustain the latter deed would be to
observe the spirit of the recording laws and to overlook the
technical rule of estoppel.
We find much diversity of opinion in the courts about
which is the proper theory. A good example of this is the
case of Ford v. Unity Church Society.' James Cargill, the
common source of title, died testate in 1858. By his will he
gave his wife, Nancy G. Cargill, a life estate in all his real
and personal property. Upon her death his son, George, was
to receive the home place and the executor was to see to the
division of all the remainder into four equal parts, one part
to each of his children. In proper time, 1879, these instruc-
tions were complied with and the lots in question were given
to John Cargill and his heirs. The present defendant claims
title through the said John Cargill. In the year 1860 John
Cargill had mortgaged his interest to all the real estate
which his father owned at his death. The trustee had, in
1865, upon default of the mortgagor, sold the land under the
mortgage. At this sale Nancy G. Cargill bought the land.
Two years prior (in 1863), said Nancy G. Cargill had deeded
to her daughter, Abby N. Ford, by a gratuitous deed, "the,
one divided fourth part" of certain lots, these lots being the
ones in question. The present plaintiff holds under Abby
N. Ford.
The Court first decides that this deed, instead of intend-
ing to convey "the one divided fourth part," really intended
to convey "the one undivided fourth part." They then
proceed to the real question of the case.
The theory upon which the present plaintiff attempts to
1. 120 Mo. 498.
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sustain his right of action here is that the title acquired by
Nancy G. Cargill by the deed of 1865 immediately passed, by
estoppel, to Abby N. Ford by reason of the deed executed
by Mrs. Cargill to Mrs. Ford two years previous.
The defendant's contention is that this action cannot be
maintained because they took without actual notice of the
prior recorded deed, and they contend, cannot be charged
with constructive notice by reason of the recording.
The deed of 1863 was from Nancy G. Cargill who, at
that time had a life estate in the property. But she did not
attempt to convey it but ittempted to convey a fee simple
title which she did not have at that time. The Court here
decides that the subsequently acquired title does not pass by
6stoppel to the grantee of the former deed. If the title did
so pass the duty would be placed upon every grantee to trace
not only his line of title, but would force him to go back of
each grantor that appeared in the chain of title and see
whether or not this prior grantor had made any deed
attempting to convey the title before he acquired title. This
position, says Mr. Rawle,2 "certainly cannot be considered
tenable." The Court says that a deed, even though it be
recorded, made by one without title, but who afterwards
acquires the title by a recorded deed, is not constructive
notice to a subsequent purchaser in good faith from the
common grantor.
In Cockrill v. Bane the Court lays down the rule that a
mortgage that purports to convey a certain estate to which
he has no title at the time may give effect to such security
by subsequently acquiring title to the same. In this case
the mortgagor had mortgaged 40 acres when he owned only
34.3 acres, later he acquired the remaining 5.7 acres. Upon
default the whole tract of 40 acres was sold. The Court
says that the acquisition of the 5.7 acres after it had pur-
2. Rawle on "Covenants for title"--Page 403.
3. 94 Mo. 444.
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ported to be conveyed in this mortgage deed served to place
it under the mortgage.
This case is in apparent conflict with the Ford ease.
The Ford case does not give effect to the former dee bVy
estoppel while in the Cockrill case the subsequent acquisition
of the property serves to make it subject to the prior deed.
It seems as though we are able to reconcile these two cases
because in the Ford -case the right of third parties had inter-
vened, while in the Cockrill case only the immediate parties
were interested.
The case of Boyd v. Hazeltine4 stands upon similar
facts and likewise can be distinguished from the Ford case.
But if there is any conflict between the Ford case and these
two prior decisions the two prior decisions are necessarily
overruled by implication.
In a subsequent case 5 the decision is not really in conflict
although, at first blush, it appears to be. A purchaser under
a tax sale had given a deed to the land in question and this
deed had been recorded before the recording of the Sheriff's
deed. The Court holds that such title passes by estoppel to
the grantee and this grantee can hold the title as against.
grantees of subsequent deeds given by the purchaser at the
tax sale whose deed was recorded after the recording of the
sheriff's deed. The ground for the decision here is based
upon the fact that the deed in question was executed after
the execution of the sheriff's deed and although it was
recorded first, still the subsequent grantees acquired
with notice of the tax suit even though they did not
necessarily acquire with notice of the particular deed.
The grounds for holding that the deed was executed
after the sheriff's deed were as follows: The sheriff's deed
had been dated September 6, 1887, and acknowledged and
4. 110 Mo. 203.
5. Norman's Land & Manufacturing Co., Appellant v. Stephen B, Hunter
& Alfred L. Harty, 270 Mo. 62.
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recorded the following March. On October 1, 1887, the deed
in question had been made. The Court says that the
acknowledgment in March referred back, and the deed "took
effect, by relation, from the date of the sale.'"' The notice
of the tax suit was sufficient to give constructive notice of
the deed. The Court here recognizes the rule as laid down in
the Ford case as good law, but holds that it is not applicable
to the facts presented here. °
The effect of all these cases is to leave the doctrine
untouched, that after-acquired title does not pass by estoppel
by reason of a prior deed recorded before the common source
of title acquires title, if the rights of third parties have
intervened. Such is unquestionably the law in Missouri.
This doctrine is also supported by decisions from other
States.7
In Calder v. Chapman,8 the question arose whether or
not, when the records showed an absolute conveyance from
Chapman to Calder, it was necessary in searching Calder's
title to go back of the conveyance of Chapman to him so as
to take in any and every possible conveyance made by Calder
before he acquired title. In support of the negative of this
proposition the Court says, "In searching for incumbrances
or conveyances, the search against Calder would begin with
his title from Chapman, and the search beyond would be
against Chapman and those through whom he claimed; and
a search against Calder during the same period would be
considered an utter absurdity." 9
To sustain the principle that the first deed is controlling,
we must hold the searchers of title in fault if they do not
look at the records for deeds made from every grantee not
6. Porter v. Mariner, 90 Mo. 364, 1. c. 368; Boyd v. Ellis, 107 Mo. 394,
1. c. 401; Bush v. White, 85 Mo. 339, 1. c. 358; Mason v. Perkins, 180 Mo.
7. Wheeler v. Young, 76 Conn. 44; Bingham v. Kirkland, 34 N. J. Eq.
8. 52 Pa. St. 339.
9. In accord, Wood v. Farmere, 7 Watts 385; M'Lanahan v. Reeside. 9
Watts 510; Loan & Trust Co. v. Maltby, 8 Paige 361.
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only subsequently to the time of acquiring the title but also
to any conveyance or incumbrance made before acquiring the
title. The mere statement of this doctrine shows its absurd-
ity. A searcher of title, by the clearly established rule, is
required to look only at the chain of title. The chain of
title, in the case of each holder, begins with the deed to him
and looks for any subsbquent conveyance or incumbrance
from him. A searcher of title cannot be required to look
for every possible, untraceable, secret estoppel that may be
lying in ambush to entrap the title.
However, there is a line of decisions which hold that the
after-acquired title passes to the prior grantee by way of
estoppel. Courts in support of this doctrine say that not
only the grantor is bound, but also his grantee.
In the case of The Builders Sash & Door Co. v. W. D.
Joyner, ° the Court says that the doctrine is fully settled
that a subsequently acquired title inures to make good a
former deed of the grantor made when such grantor has no
title.
In Cuthrell v. Hawkins," the Court says, "If A sell to B
by indenture he thereby affirms that he has title when he
made his deed, and if he did not and afterwards acquired
one, in an action by him against B the title of the latter
prevails, not because A passes to him any title, because he
had not any then to pass, but because he is precluded the
fact."
In a Delaware case, 12 the Court says, "Where one who
has no title conveys land with warranty, and afterwards
acquires title and conveys to another, the second grantee is
estopped to say that the grantor was not seized at the time
of the first conveyance. And where both parties claim under
the same person, they are privies in estate and cannot, as
10. 182 N. C. 518.
11. 98 N. C. 203.
12. Doe ex. dem. Potts v. Dowdall, 3 Houst. 369.
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such, deny the title of the grantor at the time of the first
conveyance; and the estoppel working upon the land binds
both parties and privies."
The theory advanced by cases holding to this line of
reasoning is as follows: An obligation of estoppel attaches
against not only the grantor, but his privies. It adheres
to the land and is transmitted with the estate, whether the
same passes by descent or purchase. The reason that is
given is that the estoppel becomes, and forever after remains,
a muniment of the title so acquired, and when a party so
estopped conveys the land, he necessarily conveys it subject
to such estoppel in the hands of his grantee.13
These cases necessarily overlook or ignore the regis-
tration laws. Holding to this doctrine is to allow a person
who is grossly negligent in taking a deed from a grantor
who has no title to hold in opposition to a second grantee
of this common grantor who may have looked down the
chain of title before accepting his deed. It would be more
in accord with public policy and fair dealing to make the
records constructive notice only of such deeds as are re-
corded after the grantee received title.
Decisions are numerous that if the subsequent grantee
takes with actual notice the title will inure to the benefit
of the first grantee as against the subsequent grantor.1 4
In the case of Salisbury Savings Society v. Cutting,",
the Court in speaking of the question whether a deed given
with covenants of warranty before the grantor acquires title
to the land conveyed is to prevail over a deed given after
the title is acquired by the grantor to a purchaser who takes
in good faith and with no knowledge of the previous deed
13. The cases of Ayer v. Phila. & B. Face Brick Co., 159 Mass. 84; and
Rose v. Agee, 128 Va. 502; together with many others, support this decision.
14. Ketchum v. Pleasant Valley Coal Co., 257 Fed. 274; Clark v. Baker,
14 Cal. 612; Ward v. Willard, 13 N. H. 389. In fact, the authorities upon
this proposition are practically unanimous.
15. 50 Conn. 113.
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and for value, recognize the difficulty of deciding such a
question.
In sustaining the later deed, we should have to deny the
controlling application to the case of the well settled prin-
ciple of estoppel, while in sustaining the prior deed we
should have to violate the entire spirit of the registry
system, which it is the policy, and we may say in every
other case the unyielding policy, of the law to sustain. In
this case, it was unnecessary to decide the point.
If the records are to be affected by every deed made by
a grantor, even before he acquired title, the effect of the
recording laws will be greatly affected. Such construction
could not have been within the intent of the statute.
All principles of law must stand or fall upon the final
test of whether or not they promote public justice and fair
dealing. Sustaining the prior deed is to defeat the rights of
parties who may have been very diligent in tracing their title.
It also adds an additional burden on searchers of title. To
sustain the subsequent deed is to sustain the one which has
been recorded in regular order and the one which would be
found by a searcher of title in tracing this title.
Public justice requires that the second deed be sustained
over and above the prior deed if the rights of innocent third
parties have intervened.
MAuRICE W. COvERT, '25.
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